An Impact Evaluation of Mass Replacement of School Principals in Georgia

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Principal Impact Evaluation

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• Education Reform in 2007

- All public school principals dismissed (2214 in total)
- The hiring process:
 - Candidates registered into administrative counties
 - 2 4-component test and interview
 - Around 5500 candidates selected and sorted
 - Top 20% chose school of preference
 - Sottom 80% assigned by lottery
 - Op to 3 candidates per school
 - Local governance board of each school make final decision
- Nearly half of the schools could not replace principals

The reform partitioned schools into 4 different groups:

Four groups of schools	Number	Percent
Private Schools (not affected)	247	10%
Public without Replacement	1009	41%
Public with Bottom 80% (Lottery)	590	24%
Public with Top 20%	615	25%
Total	2461	100%

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School level university enrollment rates from 2005 to 2010



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School Size around the Threshold



Outline

- Research Questions
- Literature
- Data
- Methodology
- Results
- Discussion ٠

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Research Questions

- What is the effect of the policy upon educational performance?
- How does the lottery assignment affect school outcomes?
- What kind of schools do principals, with the option, choose?

Literature

- Strong association between quality of principal and outcomes of pupils. Bloom et al, 2014
- Difficult to disentangle causal effect of school principals. Branch et al, 2012
- Leaders of schools could have impact through teacher turnover. Branch et al, 2012
- School leaders face non-bureaucratic challenges even after decentralizing policies in developing countries. Oplatka, 2004

Data

- School level Panel Data from 2005 to 2010
- NAEC (National Assessment and Examination Center)
 - University enrollment rate for each school
- MES (Ministry of Education and Science)
 - School level characteristics: Type, location, size, # of teachers, ratio of socially vulnerable students
 - Principals: Test results, registration county, school, ID

Schools in the NAEC data from 2005 to 2010

Schools in Coorgia	Year						
Schools III Georgia	2005	2006	2007*	2008	2009	2010	Total
Private	217	173	198	-	180	204	972
Public w/o Principals Replacement	953	994	804	-	833	953	4537
Public w/ Bottom 80% Principal	226	246	221	-	249	242	1184
Public w/ Top 20% Principal	316	326	295	-	346	341	1624
Total	1712	1739	1518	-	1608	1740	8317

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MES – Candidates Test Results Distribution



Methodology

• Difference-in-Differences:

 $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{period}_i + \beta_2 \text{treated}_i + \beta_3 \text{period}_i \times \text{treated}_i + \gamma X + \varepsilon_i$

• Regression Discontinuity Design:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + f(\text{test}_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

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DiD Approach



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DiD Results

Pairwise comparisons of the private and one of the 5 public	Impact of the	N of Obs.
school categories	Policy	
		Adj.R-
		squared
Private vs I (All Public Schools)	05**	7353
	(0.02)	0.39
Private vs II (Public Schools Without the New Principals)	06**	4767
	(0.02)	0.29
Private vs III (Public Schools with the New Principals)	.04*	3447
	(0.03)	0.29
Private vs IV (Public Schools with Bottom 80% Principals)	.05**	2338
	(0.02)	0.34
Private vs V (Public Schools with Top 20% Principals)	0.02	1790
	(0.02)	0.29

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DiD Results

	Before t	he Education Policy	After the Education Policy		N of Obs.	
		2005 2006	2009 2010		Adj. R-squared	
Private vs I	-0.04	-0.01	04**	05**	7353	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	0.38	
Private vs II	-0.03	0	04*	10***	4767	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	0.37	
Private vs III	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	.04**	3447	
	(0.3)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	0.38	
Private vs IV	-0.01	-0.02	.08*	.06*	2338	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	0.47	
Private vs V	-0.05	0	-0.02	0.02	1790	
	(0.4)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	0.54	

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University Enrollment Rates

For top 20% and bottom 80% schools prior to the reform



School size difference prior to the reform



Likelihood of being hired in cities around threshold prior to the reform



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Poverty Ratio



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RDD Approach



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RDD Results

Selectivity issues prior to the reform

School Characteristics	Choice versus Lottery	N of Obs.
		Adj. R-squared
University Enrollment Rate	0.01	328
	(-0.02)	0.02
School Size	95***	328
	(-10.9)	0.67
Teacher-Student Ratio	1***	328
	-0.13	0.49
Poverty Ratio	01**	328
	(-0.004)	0.02
Likelihood of being hired in Cities	.15***	328
	(-0.02)	0.72

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Discussion

- Top 20% principals chose schools of already higher quality Limited/no further improvement of school's performance
- Top 20% are usually returning principals or existing members of the academic and/or social community of their chosen schools
- Bottom 80% principals (lottery) were free from political ties
 - Able to implement significant (socially difficult) reform
 - Had greatest positive impact