

Does the transmission monetary policy shocks change when inflation is high?

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Motivation

- Inflation was back in 2021-2023 and again 2026 after 40 years.
- Is the propagation of monetary policy shocks different in high inflation regime? Is monetary policy more or less powerful?
- Menu costs (Alvarez and Lippi, 2020): high inflation, more price changes. Monetary policy shocks have larger effects on inflation and smaller effects on real activity.
- Rational Inattention (Sims, 2010): higher inflation, more attention to inflation news. Larger effects on inflation expectations, less real effects of monetary policy shocks.
- Slanted-L (Benigno and Eggertsson, 2023): higher inflation state associated with higher production costs (higher ν ratio). Monetary policy shocks have larger effects on inflation and smaller effects on real activity.

Methodology and purpose of the paper

- Use a non-linear BVAR model to study state-dependent effects.
- Identify conventional monetary policy and liquidity shocks.
- Use US data from 1960 to 2023.
- **Compare the transmission of policy shocks in a high and low inflation regimes.**
- **Draw implications for existing theories of inflation/output trade-off.**

Results

- Conventional shocks produce a weaker peak effect but more persistent dynamics in the high inflation regime.
- Conventional shocks perceived as providing new information in the **low** inflation regime.
- Liquidity shocks more expansionary in the short term in the high inflation regime.
- Liquidity shocks perceived as providing new information in the **high** inflation regime.
- Evidence inconsistent with popular theories.

Relationship with the literature

- TBVAR: Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019), , De Santis et al. (2023), Castelnuovo et al. (2024), Rossi et al. (2024), Degasperi et al (2024), **Gargiulo et al. (2024)**.
- Nonlinear models. TVC-VAR: Canova and Gambetti (2009), Primiceri (2005); Markov switching: Sims and Zha, (2009); smooth transition VAR Ascari and Haber, (2021), TVC-IV Inoue et al (2024).
- Nonlinear effects: Ravn and Sola (1996), Weise (1999), Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), Pellegrino (2021), Ascari and Haber (2021), DeBortoli et al. (2023), Benigno and Eggertsson (2023), Merikull and Rottner (2024).
- Signaling effects of monetary policy: Melosi (2017), Jarocinski (2020), Miranda Agrippino and Ricco (2021), Fisher et al. (2024).

US inflation





Figure: US Inflation (FRED Database): 1960-2023

US inflation distribution is non-normal

Figure: PCE Inflation: 1960-2023



Inflation Distribution

Mean and Median

0.0341 0.0263

Skewness and Kurtosis

1.3395 4.6256

Inter-Quartile Range

0.0176 0.0438

Croatia inflation

CROATIA INFLATION RATE (ICIR) LEVEL CHART



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The Threshold-BVAR Model I

$$Z_t = \left(c_1 + \sum_{j=1}^P \beta_1 Z_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^J \gamma_1 \ln \lambda_{t-j} + \Omega_{1t}^{1/2} e_t \right) \tilde{S}_t + \left(c_2 + \sum_{j=1}^P \beta_2 Z_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^J \gamma_2 \ln \lambda_{t-j} + \Omega_{2t}^{1/2} e_t \right) (1 - \tilde{S}_t) \quad (1)$$

- $Z_t = (Y_t, P_t, U_t, R_t, YieldSlope_t, M_t, Pcom_t, SP500_t)'$.
- The regime indicator \tilde{S}_t defined by

$$\tilde{S}_t = 1 \iff P_{t-d} \leq P^* \quad (2)$$

the delay d and the threshold level P^* are unknown parameters.

The Threshold-BVAR Model II

- The covariance matrix of e_t is:

$$\Omega_{it} = A_i^{-1} H_t (A_i^{-1})', \quad i = 1, 2 \quad (3)$$

where A_i are matrices such that

$$vec(A_i) = S_A \alpha_i + s_A$$

where S_A and s_A are matrices with 0's and 1's, see Canova and Pérez Forero, 2015.

- The volatility H_t is defined by:

$$H_t = \lambda_t \Sigma \quad (4)$$

$$\Sigma = diag(\sigma_1^2, \dots, \sigma_8^2) \quad (5)$$

$$\ln \lambda_t = \mu + F(\ln \lambda_{t-1} - \mu) + \eta_t \quad (6)$$

where η_t is an i.i.d. process with variance Q .

- λ_t is an unobservable scalar, see Carriero et al. (2016). Specification similar to a GARCH-M.

The Threshold-BVAR Model III

Variable	Conventional MP shock	Liquidity shock
Econ. Activity	0	0
PCE Inflation	≤ 0	0
Unemployment	0	0
Interest Rate	> 0	0 (24 periods)
Yield Curve Slope		≤ 0
Money Growth	< 0	> 0
Commodity Prices		
SP 500		

Table: Contemporaneous identification restrictions

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Motivation


The Empirical model

The results


Robustness

Conclusions


US inflation and the regime indicator



The posterior of the threshold parameter




The posterior of the delay parameter



Dynamic responses: conventional shocks


Impulse responses - Low and high regimes




Interpretation

- Yield slope inversion in the low regime: signaling effect?
- Run a counterfactual: fix the response of the slope in low regime to be the same as in the high regime. Check the responses of production growth, unemployment and inflation. Are they similar?
- Do inflation expectations react more to conventional shocks in the low regime?


Counterfactual dynamic responses: conventional shocks



Inflation expectations dynamics: conventional shocks




Dynamic responses: liquidity shocks




Interpretation

- SP500 inversion in high regime: signaling effect?
- Run a counterfactual: fix the response of SP500 in the high regime to be the same as in the low regime. Check the responses of production growth, unemployment and inflation. Are they similar?
- Net entry: do they respond more in high inflation regime?

Counterfactual dynamics responses: liquidity shocks




Dynamics of new entries: liquidity shocks




Evaluating PC slope theories


- Menu costs: PC slope steeper in high inflation regime.
- Rational inattention: inflation expectations more reactive to shocks in high inflation regime.
- Slanted-L: PC slope steeper if vu ratio (θ) is high.




PC slope responses (labor share): conventional shocks



PC slope responses (vu ratio): conventional shocks



Inflation expectations responses: conventional shocks



Robustness

- Eliminating λ_t from the regressors: threshold and delay unchanged. IRFS insignificantly different across states.
- Sample 1984-2019. Threshold 3.3%. IRFs insignificantly different across states.
- Drop food and energy from PCE. IRFs patterns the same. Differences across states are smaller.
- Use WTI oil prices in place of commodity prices. IRFs pattern the same. Differences across states less significant.
- Four states model. Thresholds: 1.5, 3.3, 5.3 %. IRFs for top-bottom groups unchanged.
- Liquidity shocks with no constraints: short term rate responds positively and significantly immediately.

Conclusions

- Conventional monetary policy less powerful but have longer lasting effects in the high inflation regime.
- Bond markets perceive the shock differently.
- Liquidity shocks are more expansionary in the short term in the high inflation regime.
- Stock market perceive the shock differently.
- Evidence at odds with standard models of inflation. Consistent with asymmetric informational effects.

The data




















Figure: The US Data (FRED Database): 1960-2023


Linear model: contractionary conventional MP shocks




Linear model : expansionary liquidity shocks




The posteriors of contemporaneous structural parameters



The uncertainty indicator λ_t



US inflation and λ_t based predictions






Figure: Posterior distribution persistence parameter F




Figure: Posterior distribution mean parameter μ





Figure: Posterior distribution variance parameter Q

Posterior of conventional monetary policy shocks



Posterior of liquidity shocks

